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Abstract—Pay-As-You-Drive insurance schemes are establishing themselves as the future of car insurance. However, their current
implementations, in which fine-grained location data are sent to insurers, entail a serious privacy risk. We present PriPAYD, a system
where the premium calculations are performed locally in the vehicle, and only aggregated data are sent to the insurance company,
without leaking location information. Our design is based on well-understood security techniques that ensure its correct functioning. We
discuss the viability of PriPAYD in terms of cost, security, and ease of certification. We demonstrate that PriPAYD is possible through a
proof-of-concept implementation that shows how privacy can be obtained at a very reasonable extra cost.
Index Terms—Communication system security, legal factors, privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
INSURANCE represents a large fraction of the cost of owninga car. In order to lower costs for both owners and insurers,
insurance companies have developed Pay-As-You-Drive,
PAYD, (or Pay-Per-Mile) models. In contrast to the current
pay-by-the-year policy, customers are charged depending
on where and when they drive, instead of a fixed premium
per year. For each kilometer that a car is driven, the
statistical risk of accident is calculated and translated into a
personalized insurance fee. A PAYD contract clearly lays
out the exact fares for driving under different conditions
depending on the type of road, time of day, etc.
Pay-As-You-Drive insurance models are hailed as the
future of car insurance due to their advantages for users and
companies [1], [2], [3]. Arguments in favor of PAYD
insurance are first, that the insurance fees applied to each
user seem fairer than the ones in the pay-by-the-year
scheme, as customers are only charged for the actual
kilometers they travel. Customers could also reduce their
monthly bill by choosing cheap itineraries or by just not
using their car. This, in turn, would make vehicle insurance
affordable for lower income car users (e.g., young people) or
for people who wish to have a second vehicle. Second,
PAYD policies can be socially beneficial by encouraging
responsible driving, for instance, discouraging youngsters
from driving at night. This would decrease the risk of
accidents, which in turn saves money for users and insurers
(aside from saving lives). Finally, PAYD has a potential
environmental benefit, as it discourages driving, hence
reduces energy consumption and pollution emissions. Due
to all these advantages, PAYD insurance policies are
supported by motorist associations like the National
Motorist Association [4] and the American Automobile
Association [5]; and they are being widely developed by
insurance companies all over the world like Uniqa Group [6]
(Austria), Hollard Insurance [7] (South Africa), MAPFRE [8]
(Spain), or Aioi [9] (Japan), among others.
Although PAYD insurance seems to have many advan-
tages, its current implementations involve an inherent threat
to user’s privacy. This has been one of the factors slowing
adoption and has been reported as one of the reasons some
major schemes were discontinued (as the Norwich Union’s
PAYD program [10]). In most of the implemented schemes,
the full information used for billing (the time and position
where the car was) is gathered by a black box in the car. It is
then transferred to the insurance company and, in some of
the cases, to a third company providing the location and/or
data transportation infrastructure. Some companies claim to
provide privacy preserving PAYD schemes, as they collect
only statistics about the location data (e.g., how much time a
driver was driving in a highway, but not when and on
which highway). However, these statistics are computed by
a third party who collects and keeps the raw location data,
hence the threat to privacy does not disappear but is only
shifted. As a result, insurance companies and/or third
parties build vast databases of location data. For instance,
Octo Telematics [11] reports to work for more than 30
companies in Europe and to have more than 1,000,000
clients in May 2010. Even if the location traces are
anonymized, it has been demonstrated that the identity of
the driver can be recovered from the traces themselves [12],
[13] thus the privacy of the customers is still put in danger.
This situation has a downside both for the companies and
the customers. For the former, managing these huge
databases implies the risk of information leakage [14], [15]
and consequent damage for the company in terms of cost
and/or reputation toward the public. For the client the main
disadvantage is that, in this model, the insurance company
has the ability to track any of its users with ease and
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precision and even make profit out of these data [16]. The
possession of an individual’s fine-grained location data
allow for inferences with private data, as the places visited
may reveal sensitive information. For instance, affiliation to
a given political party when its headquarters are visited
often, or health status when the person has frequent
appointments at a specific clinic (e.g., doctors specialized
in AIDS treatments). Iqbal and Lim show how GPS data can
be automatically analyzed to produce profiles of driver’s
behavior, social activities, and work activities [17]. For
instance, in their study they could identify the home location
of the population subject to the experiment in four out of five
cases. For the last case, the error on the prediction stemmed
only from the fact that the car was parked in an under-
ground parking instead of in front or near the actual
building. An extensive discussion on the consequences of
losing location privacy can be found in [18].
Our contribution is to propose PriPAYD, a privacy-
friendly scheme, where the premium computation is done
in the car’s black box, and only the minimum information
necessary to bill the client is received by the insurance
company. We provide an overview of our architecture, in
which well-understood techniques are combined to give
assurance to the user that the insurance company does not
get more information than necessary, while granting him
(or a judge in case of dispute) access to all the data. Our
techniques also permit easy policy management and policy
enforcement by the insurer. We also describe how user’s
misuse of the system can be detected such that appropriate
measures can be taken by the insurance company.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents a survey on the current implementations of PAYD
policies, and related work. In Section 3, we give a detailed
description of our privacy-friendly scheme. We describe our
proof-of-concept implementation in Section 4.Wediscuss the
feasibility of our scheme and compare it with the previous
work in Section 5, and finally we conclude in Section 6.
2 A SURVEY OF PAYD IMPLEMENTATIONS
Pay-As-You-Drive plans are offered by many insurance
companies around the world, gathering the data in a variety
of ways. We can distinguish three types of policies, based
on how privacy-invasive they are. Some of them do not
imply any breach of privacy since the data about the
amount of kilometers traveled (no location information)
needed to compute the premium, is provided only once a
year from a fixed location. The second type, despite not
recording location information, collects data in geographi-
cally distributed points, which allow the insurance to
estimate the movements of the user. Finally, the last model
collects GPS data to track all the car’s movements. In the
rest of the section, we present real-world systems that fit in
these three categories. Table 1 offers a summary.
The first type of systems, the least privacy-invasive, are
also the least numerous. Examples of this model are Corona
Direct [19] (Belgium) and Polis Direct [20] (Netherlands).
They only use the data from the car odometer, obtained in
annual vehicle inspections, and per-kilometer premiums
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TABLE 1
Current PAYD Implementations
are calculated by dividing current premiums by the current
policy maximum annual kilometers. GMAC Insurance [21]
(US) follows a similar idea, and offers discounts for their
clients based on their monthly mileage. This is hardly
privacy-sensitive, since it does not reveal where the car has
been over time. Although this scheme is the most advisable
[22], it seems not to be economically practical. The manage-
ment costs of reading the car odometer are high, thus the
reduction in the fee is small and the policy benefits are
negligible for both customer and insurer. For this reason,
Polis Direct removed this policy from the market [23].
WGV [24], a German insurance company, offers a
different scheme that does not infringe the user’s privacy
either. They collect the car speed and they use GPS to locate
the road where the car is driving, but with the sole purpose
of checking that speed limits are being observed and
without saving any location data. When the speed limit for
a given route is exceeded, the user collects “negative”
points that have repercussions on his final premium.
Other nonprivacy-invasive methods are based on prepaid
insurance, as proposed by Milimeter [25] in Dallas (US). In
their scheme, “auto insurance by the mile,” customers buy
miles in advance and renew as needed, thus there is no need
for vehicle tracking devices. The system is not yet available,
and its legality under European law is questionable (see
Section 5.1).
In the second group of PAYD policies, we find models
such as the one from Aioi [9], a Japanese insurance
company. They install a device in the car that records the
odometer value, the car condition, and the time. This
information is collected by receivers placed by the road,
thus allowing to approximate the car trips. This datum is
sent to the insurance central database for billing purposes
and, also, to the database of the company that provides the
data collectors.
Two companies, AVIVA (Canada) and Progressive
Casualty Insurance (US), supply devices (Autograph [41]
in the first case, and TripSense [27] and MyRate [42] in the
second) that can be easily connected by the user to the On
Board Diagnostics II (OBDII) port of the car. This device
collects: trip start and end time, miles driven, duration of
trip, number of sudden starts and stops, and time and date
of each connection/disconnection to the OBDII port. These
data can be seen by the client in a personal computer and
can be exchanged for discounts if sent to the insurer. In this
case, however, Progressive will retain information collected
or derived from the device indefinitely. In Germany, a
similar device is used by Swiss Re [43], and a variant is
adopted by DBV Winterthur [44] giving the user the
opportunity of exchanging data for discounts. They collect,
through the use of GPS, the route information of the vehicle,
from which they infer the kilometers traveled, the speed
and the behavior of the user.
Some patented schemes proposemodels that also fit in the
second group. Patent ES2108613 [32], for instance, suggests a
model where the car is fitted with speed sensors and
accelerometers, and also collects data from special devices
on the roadside. The gathered data are sent to the insurer via
“data collectors” present in garages and petrol stations.
Finally, we can find models that base their premium
calculations on continuous collection of data, which leads to
the gravest invasion of customers’ privacy. Many insurance
companies have chosen to follow this model. For example:
Hollard Insurance [7] performs a PAYD insurance based on
Skytrax GPS service (supplied by Mobile Data [30]) in South
Africa. This GPS module is installed in the car, records all
the data (position, time, speed, etc.) and stores it in a server,
where the client can access it from the Internet. This is
privacywise the worse model, as not only the insurance
company builds a huge database of clients’ location data,
but also a third party has a copy of this database.
Progressive Insurance Corp. (US) [35], registered the US
Patent US5797134 [34], in which they propose to gather the
necessary data for billing (where, when and how much the
car has been driven) using GPS. At the end of each month, a
GSM phone fitted in the car (which is part of the policy)
reports to Progressive all driving patterns. They go even
further, proposing the collection of data that would give an
idea of the safe operation of the vehicle by the driver such as
speed, safety equipmentused (seat belt, turn signals, etc.) rate
of acceleration, rate of braking, or observation of traffic signs.
This scheme was closely followed by Norwich Union
[33] in the United Kingdom, owner of European patent (EP)
number 0700009 [32]. Their policy was based on less data as
they only considered the time of the day, the type of road
(more or less dangerous) used, and the number of kilo-
meters driven. Nevertheless, Norwich Union kept all the
location and timing data collected from the GPS signal, that
was transferred to their central database via GSM. In their
scheme, the collected data were handled by at least four
companies: Norwich Union itself, a market agency and
another two companies handling the back-end systems.
After two years in the market, the company stopped the
program due to the small amount of clients that signed for
this scheme. One of the main reasons for this failure is that
there was significant uncertainty about the protection and
use of information obtained by the insurance company [10].
We find a very similar scheme in Austria, where Uniqa
Group [6] offers an insurance that uses aGPSdevice in the car
to collect locationdatumand transmits it once aday, viaGSM,
to the base station of the company. The data are then used to
calculate the monthly premium of the client. The same
scheme is announced in Germany by Pincar [45]. In Italy,
“Sarafree Km” is offered by the insurance company SARA
[36]. In this scheme, customers install a GPS device (supplied
by Movitrack [37]) that collects the datum and sends it to the
insurer. The company calculates from these data the client
premium based on the actual kilometers driven.
Among the insurance companies providing PAYD based
on satellite data, a Spanish company makes some effort to
protect the privacy of their users. MAPFRE [8] offers the
installation of a black box in the car that records: kilometers
driven, type of roads used, average length of the trips, time
of the day, regions in Spain where the car has been driven,
average speed, and percentage of night hours. In order to
obtain these data, the company relies on a third party to
receive and process the raw data, providing the insurance
only with aggregated anonymized data. In this procedure,
the third party does not have access to the personal data
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corresponding to the GPS data it is processing. However,
full anonymity is not possible in this scheme, as the datum
itself may reveal the actual identity (and other personal
data) of the vehicle owner [12], [17] via simple profiling.
There are also third parties that offer insurers the
necessary technology in order to implement GPS PAYD
policies like STOK [38] (Netherlands). This company offers a
system to be installed in cars, as well as the means to transfer
the information collected to the insurance company and
present it to the client (while having the data themselves).
The same service is offered by iMetrik [46] in Germany.
Although Norwich Union has stopped PAYD insurance,
Coverbox [40] (Wunelli Limited) has taken over in offering
this kind of services. This company acts as a proxy between
the user and main insurance companies in the United
Kingdom. Through a black box installed in the vehicle,
Coverbox monitors customers usage in terms of distance
covered and the time of day or night a vehicle is in use, and
computes the premium according to the kilometers driven
in off-peak, peak, or “super-peak” periods. In their
description of the service, it is unclear the amount of data
shared between Coverbox and the insurance company that
finally charges the customer.
In Europe, Octo Telematics [11] offer themselves to
collect and process location data for PAYD insurance. In
their scheme, the location data of drivers are collected in
their central database. Then, these data are processed and
aggregated information is given to the insurance company
for the final billing. Further, these data can be available also
for car makers and authorities. We note that, although final
entities receive only aggregated or “anonymized” informa-
tion, the central database holds a precise log of the system
users’ movements.
A more developed technology is the one introduced by
iPAID [31] (Canada); they present a GPS tracking solution
for driving data collection. It records when, where, how far,
how fast, and how aggressively a vehicle was driven on the
in-vehicle iPAID unit. These data can be transmitted to the
central server in a passive way (via a USB key, Bluetooth, or
wirelessly) or an active way (using the GSM network) which
compiles it in statistics and trip logs, which the user can look
up through the web. These statistics are also given to the
insurance company in order to calculate the premium.
A comprehensive list and description of current Pay-As-
You-drive practices can be found in [47].
2.1 Other Related Work
Besides Pay-As-You-Drive insurance, similar schemes are
being developed in several countries for road pricing, and
an European Electronic Road Tolling system is being
introduced in the European Union [48]. Road pricing
schemes charge motorists directly for driving on a
particular road or in a particular area, and can include fuel
taxes, license fees, parking taxes, tolls, and/or congestion
charges. Some of these schemes are semiprivacy-invasive,
like the proposal form the Maltese government in which
dedicated cameras monitor and photograph the number
plates of cars entering and exiting in Valleta [49]. Given the
collected data, it is possible to learn when cars enter or leave
the city, but not to infer all their movements. However,
other governments (e.g., United Kingdom [50]) propose
satellite-based schemes in which, as in PAYD, the full
record of cars’ movements is logged. See [51], for a
comprehensive study of road pricing schemes. Further-
more, companies that are already collecting data for road
tolling try to market these data for PAYD insurance use, as
for instance, Skymeter [39] (US) does. They provide
distance, time, place, velocity, and acceleration information
depending on the selected policy requirements and affirm
these can reliably be used to calculate insurance premiums.
Car telematics is not the only area where new technol-
ogies that allow fine-grained measurements increase the
danger of customer’s privacy violations. In the field of
electrical metering, a new billing system in which the
electrical consumption of subscribers is continuously mon-
itored, is being pushed in the European Union [52]. The
goal of the system is to help the service provider to optimize
the electrical grid (thus improving energy use). As in
PAYD, these measurements would result in a decrease on
the final premium, but mining these data allows to deduce
users habits (e.g., when the inhabitants are not at home). A
solution was presented by LeMay et al. in [53], [54] that
preserves user privacy against both the electric company
and casual or malicious eavesdroppers. As in PriPAYD, the
only datum transferred (and thus available to third parties)
is aggregated data that can be used for billing, but does not
leak any sensitive information.
2.2 The Abstract “Continuous Model”
We chose to model one of the most privacy-invasive, data-
hungry PAYD model that is available today. We call
“Continuous Model” any system in which the data are
collected by GPS, using a black box installed in the car, and
then are sent to the insurance company (directly or through
an intermediary). This model is a generalization of all the
other models, meaning that less privacy-invasive policies
(such as those that only take into account odometer
readings) can also be implemented using it.
The GPS-based Pay-As-You-Drive insurance is illu-
strated in Fig. 1a. It works as follows: as the car is being
driven, GPS data are collected by the insurance black box.
The full data gathered are sent to the insurance company,
who will do the accounting to obtain the client’s premium
and send the bill by traditional post, together with a user-
friendly (reduced) version of the full GPS data. (This is very
close to the Coverbox [40] operating procedures.)
It is important to note that the correctness of the billing
depends on the black box. For this reason, both the
customer as well as the insurer have stakes in its correct
functioning, as well as incentives to game it to their
advantage. To prevent malicious behavior in practice, the
boxes are provided by the insurance company and should
be protected using tamper evidence and tamper resistance
techniques [55] making it hard for the car user to modify
their behavior. Moreover, the car user receives a detailed
bill that allows him to audit the trips contributing to his
premium and legally challenge the premium if they do not
correspond with actual car movements.
In a typical model such as the Coverbox policy [40],
GPS data points (coordinates and time) need to be mapped
to different road categories (more or less dangerous) in
order to extract the final premium. The fact that these
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computations can be offloaded onto powerful servers
having access to online up-to-date data sources makes
the “Continuous Model” very flexible and easily adapta-
ble, as premium rate adjustments and/or road map
updates can be performed centrally. We note however
that the frequency of dynamic changes in the premium
rates is restricted by the fact that the insurance policy
should be predictable and easy to understand by the
customer (which is required for a contract to be fair).
This model puts service providers (either insurers or third
parties) in an advantageous business position. With all the
data collected, new services (traffic information, pollution
information, etc.) can be offered to customers. It also allows
providers to perform data mining to detect potential fraud.
However, the obvious disadvantage of the “Continuous
Model” is that it is privacy-invasive, as the data collected by
the insurance company is sufficient to track almost every
movement of a car over time. The data are transmitted
sometimes over third parties, such as the GSM network or a
third-party location data provider. Once the location data
have been transmitted, the data subject has little control
over it. These data could be stored or retained for long
periods, as well as used for other purposes than the ones
they have been collected. Although Data Protection legisla-
tion may impose limits on what can be done with it, the
penalties for breaching them are often very light. So far,
GSM lawful interception interfaces could be used by the
authorities to get access to the location data without the
knowledge of the users or even insurers [56]. Given the
legal void, we fully expect to see such attempts. Moreover,
after 20 years, the security of the original A5/1 and A5/2
GSM encryption algorithms has been degraded to an extent
that production cryptanalysis on massive GSM traffic is
within reach of many organizations [57].
3 PRIPAYD: PRIVACY-FRIENDLY PAYD
INSURANCE
We present the PriPAYD architecture (see Fig. 1b) that
follows closely the “Continuous Model” with the exception
that the raw and detailed GPS data are never provided to
third parties. The main advantage of PriPAYD, is that the
insurance company receives only the billing data instead of
the exact vehicle locations (thus cannot invade the user’s
privacy) while being sure he is receiving the correct data.
The client can check that only the allowed data are being
transferred to in the insurance company database and the
raw data are available for the client to check the correctness
of the bill in case of dispute between user and insurer.
Before diving into the details of the scheme, it is
important to delineate our threat model. There is little
point for our system to try to protect user’s privacy beyond
what road users already expect today. We assume that any
third-party adversary that has extensive physical control of
the car will be able to track it (by simply installing their own
tracking system).
The objective of PriPAYD is to limit casual and/or
deliberate surveillance by the insurance company or any
third parties (with limited physical access to the car), as well
as preventing the aggregation of a mass of location informa-
tion in centralized databases. Fine-grained location/timing
information should be hard to obtain for any third party
except the policy holder, who has the right to audit the bill
and ensure its fairness. This protection still allows for
surveillance of the drivers (in case, they differ from the
policy holders), but we are satisfied that no systemic
surveillance risk is introduced beyond what is already
possible today.
Our design safeguards the privacy of the policy holder and
the integrity of the billing information. Yet some attacks
against the availability of the PriPAYD (or previous PAYD
schemes) cannot be prevented while using cheap, off-the-
shelf, technology such as GPS and GSM. Our design
attempts to detect that such attacks are taking place, but
how they are dealt with has to be the subject of agreement
between the insurance and the policy holder, and appro-
priate actions or penalties must be codified in the contract to
deal with them. Our guiding design philosophy throughout
is that the privacy-friendly mechanisms should introduce
no additional vulnerabilities in PAYD with respect to the
“Continuous Model.”
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Fig. 1. (a) “Continuous Model” PAYD scheme, and (b) Privacy-friendly PAYD model.
3.1 Overview of PriPAYD
The key difference between PriPAYD and the “Continuous
Model” is that all computations transforming the GPS data
into billing data are performed in the vehicle black box. The
data involved in the calculation of the final premium are the
number of kilometers traveled, the hour of the day, the road
the user has chosen, and the rate per kilometer (hour and
road type) given by the insurer (following the Octo
Telematics model [11]). To perform the conversion, maps
have to be available to the device, and calculations have to be
performed to match the coordinates with road types. These
are no more complex than the operations already supported
by any off-the-shelf commercial GPS navigation system.
The rates imposed by the insurer or other policy
parameters can be initialized in the black box when
installing it, and can be updated later in a trustworthy
manner through signed updates. For the purposes of this
work, we consider that policies have a unique IDpolicy that
uniquely identifies the rates interpreted by the black box. A
similar mechanism can be used to perform software
upgrades (uploading new firmware to the black box) with
identifier IDcode.
Once the premium for a period of time is calculated, the
amount to be paid, along with the current policy, IDpolicy,
and code version, IDcode, is sent in a secure way to the
insurance company via GPRS, or even the cheaper SMS
services (as currently done by Segurmovil [58] of MAPFRE
[8]). A time stamp TS is included to protect the insurance
company against reply attacks, in which a client could try to
resubmit a message where the premium is low later in time.
The data are signed using the black box key, and encrypted
under the public key of the insurance company, in a special
way that allows the policy holder to check that only the
minimum billing information is transmitted (see Section 3.2).
To ensure that the black box is not acting maliciously in
favor of the insurance company, we need to allow a car user
or owner to audit the billing mechanism. For this purpose,
we propose the use of an off-the-shelf USB memory stick.
The data are recorded in an encrypted way on this token so
that only the policy holder can access it, and it is signed by
the black box to ensure its authenticity and integrity such
that it is usable as evidence. The symmetric encryption key
is generated by the black box and provided to the policy
holder in two shares: one written on the USB stick and the
other relayed through the insurance company and deliv-
ered by post with the bill. A simple mechanism, such as
pushing a button on the box for some time, allows the
encryption key to be reset. We note that certification is
needed to ensure that the box properly resets this key and
does not keep old information that may lead to a privacy
breach in the future. See Section 5.4 for a more detailed
discussion on the certification process.
3.2 The Security of PriPAYD
At the heart of the PriPAYD security policy, we have a two-
level Bell-La Padula policy [59]: the confidential (high) level
contains the sensors and records of the vehicle position and
at the restricted (low) level we have the billing information.
The only party that is authorized to access the confidential
information is the policy holder, while the insurance
company is only authorized to access the billing information.
(Note that there is no restriction in the insurance company
sending information up to confidential, i.e., policy or
software updates.) In this context, transferring billing
information to the insurance company is an act of declassifica-
tion, since the data at high level are sanitized (only the
amount of the final premium is sent) to not leak any
information, and sent to low. The provision of the detailed
location records by the policy holder, as part of a dispute, is
an even more radical act of declassification.
Three key security properties are required from the
channel that transfers the billing data from the vehicle to the
insurance company:
Authenticity. Only the black box can produce billing
data that are accepted as genuine by the
insurer or any other third party.
Confidentiality. Only the insurer and the car owner
should be able to read the billing data
transmitted.
Privacy. The policy holder should be able to
verify that only the billing data are sent to
the insurer.
Authenticity and confidentiality.A public key signature
scheme [60] can be used to certify that the data have been
generated and sent by the black box. As in the “Continuous
Model,” the signature key in the black box is difficult to
extract due to a custom tamper-resistant solution [61] or
established smart card [62] technology. Public key encryp-
tion [60] can be used to encrypt the billing information
(Data) under the public key of the insurer. There is no key
distribution problem since the fingerprints of all public keys
are seeded in the box when the device is fitted.
We denote a message sent by the black box to the
insurance company,
M ¼ EncInsurer KeyðD; SigBox KeyðDÞÞ: ð1Þ
In (1), D ¼ ðData; IDpolicy; IDcode; TS ¼ time stampÞ,
where IDpolicy and IDcode indicate the policy and the
firmware used in the computation of Data, as explained
in Section 3.1. We note that the Privacy property, that allows
the user to verify that only billing data are transferred, can
also be enforced. Any signature scheme (SigBox KeyðÞ) as
well as public key encryption scheme (EncInsurer KeyðÞ) are
verifiable: the policy holder can be convinced that the
encryption is correct by being given the randomness used to
perform the encryption operation (in the detailed audit log).
The signature can then be verified to ensure it is correctly
computed on D. Verifying these only requires the public
key of the insurance and the verification key of the black
box, that are public.
Privacy. The task of verifying that no other information is
contained in the messages is made difficult by the existence
of subliminal channels [63], [64] (or covert channels) in
signature schemes with the potential to leak information
from a maliciously programmed black box back to the
insurance company. Subliminal channels, as well as techni-
ques to limit their capacity, have been extensively studied in
the multilevel secure systems literature. PriPAYD imple-
mentations should either use signature and encryption
schemes that are free from such channels, or estimate their
capacity and keep it under a certain threshold [65]. For
instance, the client should have control over the source that
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produced the randomness used in the encryption such that
no message can be embedded on it (see Section 5.4). A
further security measure would be to let the user choose
when and where does the black box communicate with the
insurance company. This measure avoids covert messages
hidden in the time or location where the message was sent
and has a positive influence in the privacy-preserving
properties of the system (see Section 5.3). Other ways to
give the user full control over the data transmitted would be
to use signcryption [66] or a deterministic authenticated
encryption scheme [67].
Privacy-friendly auditing. A detailed log of all the
vehicle’s movements (consisting of location and time) and
other audit information can be extracted from the black box
(signed to ensure its authenticity and that the client cannot
tamper with the data), by plugging a portable device such
as a USB stick on it. However, it should only be accessible to
the policy holder. This is not a trivial requirement to fulfill
since the black box and the policy holder need to share a
symmetric key, unknown to any third party (including the
insurance company). We solve the key exchange problem
by having the black box generate the symmetric key and
deriving two shares of it (using a secure secret sharing
scheme [68], for instance, Ks ¼ Ks1 Ks2 , where  denotes
the exclusive or operation).
The first part of the key (Ks1 ) is written to a USB stick
when the system is initialized (e.g., by pushing a button in
the box more than five seconds) and the second part (Ks2 ) is
relayed through the insurance company and received by the
user as part of their billing sealed envelope. Both key parts
are necessary to decrypt the detailed log of location data,
and check its correctness. (Special software can be provided
by any third party to reassemble the key parts, decrypt,
read and present the detailed location logs on any
commodity computer.) Through this mechanism, we ensure
that only the policy holder can access these data, as neither
the insurer nor any person with direct access to the car (e.g.,
garage mechanics) will have access to the whole key.
It may be the case (e.g., if the insurance and the mechanic
collide) that both shares of the key are stolen, in an attempt
to compromise the privacy of the policy holder. To avoid
this, any time the black box is asked to output the
encryption key, it creates a fresh pair of shares to be used
to encrypt any further data guaranteeing forward security.
This mechanism is also useful if the policy holder is
worried that his keys were otherwise compromised: he can
force the reinitialization of the system. As explained
before, upon re-initialization the black box records a fresh
key share Ks1 on the USB stick, and sends the second fresh
share Ks2 to the insurance company. To ensure forward
secrecy, the old keys and past audit data are securely
deleted from the box (see Section 5.3).
We note that, if the key Ks is not refreshed often enough,
it may be used to encrypt a fair amount of data. This can be
exploited by someone with physical access to the box, hence
to the ciphertext, to decrypt and obtain the locations a
vehicle has visited, or even to the guess the key Ks [69]. To
avoid this problem, we propose the usage of a session key
that varies over time in such a way that an attacker would
never have enough data to mount this kind of attack. The
frequency with which the session key needs to change
depends on its length and the encryption algorithm chosen.
The session key K0 used to encrypt a given set of locations
can be given to the user encrypted under Ks making sure
that he is the only one able to recoverK0 while guaranteeing
that a small amount of data is encrypted under the long-
term key Ks.
Detection of the black box’s inputs tampering. Even if
the insurance company can verify the authenticity of the data
and can trust the black box for correctness, once the box is
installed in the car, the company has no control over its
environment. Amalicious clientmay try to take advantage of
the situation and tamperwith the incoming and/or outgoing
signals (GPS, GSM, etc.) to reduce the final premium.
Given the difficulty of preventing attacks on technologies
such asGSMorGPS, our approach consists in focusing on the
detection of such attempts. In the following, we enumerate
possible attack scenarios on these interfaces, andwe propose
technical solutions that can be implemented in PriPAYD.We
note that these threats are common for any PAYD model
using GPS and GSM technologies, hence the proposed
countermeasures should not increase the costs of deploying
PriPAYD with respect to the “Continuous Model.”
The first point of attack against our system could be the
manipulation of the GPS signal received by the box in such
a way that the total number of kilometers or the type of
roads used result in a smaller premium. Kuhn [70] describes
how the user could realistically try to tamper with the
GPS signal or receiver, and proposes a countermeasure. The
solution offered by Kuhn relies on modifying the whole
Global Positioning Signal system, therefore is unrealistic in
the short term and cannot be used for our application. We
propose here two solutions that, although they are not
suitable for general purposes, solve the problem for
PriPAYD at a reasonable cost.
The first approach assumes that the insurance company
has knowledge of the car odometer value (as we argued in
Section 2 for Polis Direct [20] and Corona Direct [19], this is
not sensitive datum, as it is only aggregated data and does
not reveal the location of the car). The total number of
kilometers driven is also computed from the GPS signal
information when calculating the premium and stored in
the black box. This value is sent along with the billing
information to the back office at the end of each billing
period. Then, in regular inspections, the insurance company
can check that the value computed from the GPS signal
corresponds to the one captured by the odometer. In case
these values considerably differ, the insurer can infer an
attempt of cheating in the client side has happened and act
in consequence (e.g., charging the client with a higher
premium than the one he would obtain without cheating,
according to the terms of the contract). However, the user
shall be given the right to contest the assumption made by
the insurance company. In order to discourage users from
tampering with the odometer value before an inspection, its
value should be also checked in case of accident and if the
control fails, the insurance would hold the car owner liable
for breach of his contractual obligations.
A second option to ensure GPS signal correctness would
be to use the GSM localization features of the SIM card
contained in the black box. In this case, the test consists in
checking that the GPS coordinates received by the black box
are matched by the location of the GSM cell in which the
TRONCOSO ET AL.: PRIPAYD: PRIVACY-FRIENDLY PAY-AS-YOU-DRIVE INSURANCE 7
SIM is transmitting. In order to make this possible, subtle
modifications in the PriPAYD scheme are needed, as in the
current description the insurance company never learns the
location of the car, hence it cannot carry out the test. To
allow this test, the black box would send the current GPS
position to the insurer at random points in time (chosen by
the box or upon request from the back-end office). Then, the
company would check (together with the GSM provider)
that the coordinates are actually located in the GSM cell
used for the communication. In order to maintain the
privacy-friendly properties of PriPAYD checks should only
be allowed as very rare intervals (e.g., a few times a year),
so that it is impossible to estimate the car’s movements. A
passive variant of this approach can also be used: the GSM
subsystem can provide the black box with the signal
strength of nearby mobile phone antennas. A simple
database matching antennas with locations can then be
used to cross-check the correctness of the GPS signal. This
does not require the transmission of any position informa-
tion, as the validation happens within the car. On the
downside, this option relies upon the availability of a map
of mobile base stations (a service that is already commer-
cially available today).
The GPS signal correctness is not the only issue that
stems from the fact that the black box is most of the time in a
hostile environment. Even when the user cannot modify the
GPS signal, he could try to decrease his monthly premium
by blocking it part of the time, thus appearing as having
driven less. For this purpose, he could break off the GPS
antenna, or enclose it in a Faraday cage. He could also jam
the GPS satellite signals with a close by, or even touching,
transmitter. Even if those attacks are beyond the technical
capabilities of most people, the technical know-how could
be built into easy to download software or disseminated
through rogue mechanics. Misleading GPS has other
nefarious applications, such as stealing GPS tracked cargo
or fooling home detention bracelets so it is likely that crooks
will invest in defeating it in the near future.
A possible cheap countermeasure against GPS attacks is
for the black box to measure the time the car is in movement
and compare it with the GPS reading availability. Move-
ment can be inferred by connecting the black box to the
engine, which is already done in some PAYD models today.
An even cheaper and more reliable way to detect movement
is to include in the black boxes tamper-resistant envelope a
three-dimensional accelerometer [71] to detect movement.
If GPS availability goes under a preestablished threshold,
the black box can inform the company that, in turn, would
take the appropriate measures (see Section 5.1). When
establishing this threshold, the company should consider
the fact that even when the client is not misbehaving the
signal may not be received due to weather conditions,
terrain features, tunnels, etc.
Another manner of tampering with the premium, would
be to block the incoming and outgoing GSM signals [55]. If
the former is stopped, no software nor policy updates
would reach the box, therefore, no increase in the fees nor
patches would be registered, resulting in an advantage
situation for the user. Blocking the latter, the user would
prevent his premium from arriving at the insurance
company. Both cases could be attributed to failures in the
GSM network or in the box itself. As with GPS signal
blocking, tampering can be detected, for instance, by
making sure that regular billing messages are received,
using the IDpolicy field to check that the policies are
updated, etc. Once GSM jamming is detected, the user will
in any case be liable for violating his contractual obligations
toward the insurance company (see Section 5.1).
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In road pricing schemes, it is often argued that by providing
the black box with the intelligence to compute the fee the
system becomes more expensive and less flexible than with
a back-end server. For example, in an study funded by the
Dutch government [72], it is claimed that the advantages of
a model based on a back-end server can only be achieved by
a black box-centric solution “with very high risks and
probably much higher costs.” Our black box demonstrator
aims at showing that the functionality of PriPAYD can be
achieved within reasonable production costs, while proving
the validity and correctness of the PriPAYD design.
In this section, we introduce the hardware and software
modules that comprise our embedded platform and we
present our results, in terms of computational load of the
main operations, for a given test case scenario. A more
detailed description of this prototype can be found in [73].
4.1 Modules
The PriPAYD black box presented in this paper requires the
following hardware and software elements:
. A processing unit, which stores and runs the software
executing the basic operations of the system. We
choose to implement our demonstrator on the widely
used ARM7TDMI [74] 32-bit low-power architecture,
more precisely on an NXP LPC2388 [75] microcon-
troller. This microcontroller has a 32-bit RISC archi-
tecture, it can run at 72 MHz, it offers 512 kB of on-
chip program memory and 98 kB of internal SRAM.
For the development of applications, we make use of
the Keil MCB2388 evaluation board [76].
. AGPS receiverand aGSM modem, where the former
collects the location data and the latter allows to
establish communications via the GSM/GPRS net-
work. We use the Telit GM862-GPS [77] module
since it combines both capabilities in a single device.
. An external nonvolatile memory, which stores large
static parameters of the system such as the digital
road map and the encrypted journey logs. The
MCB2388 board offers two possible interfaces for
external memory storage: an SD card interface and a
USB Host port.
. A digital road map, a database of pairs latitude-
longitude where each of these entries has assigned a
type of road. In our implementation, we make use of
OpenStreetMap [78] free digital road maps.
4.2 Performance
The main bottleneck of the scheme is the map-matching
operation, i.e., the translation from GPS location data to type
of road. This is because theGPS receiver provides (bydefault)
a location string every second, thus the map-matching
operation must be carried out within this time span.
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In order to extract the timings of all operations, we run
the following test case scenario:
1. We store in an SD card a digital road map database
of Belgium containing around 1.5 million entries
together with the insurer’s policy table, which
specifies a price per Km depending on two factors:
type of road and time zone.
2. We drive for 40 minutes, such that different types of
roads are involved. Every time that a new location
string is available from the GPS receiver the map-
matching operation is called in order to search which
node of the digital road map database is closest to
the position of the vehicle. When a new node is
found, the distance between this node and the
previous one is computed and stored along with
the type of road and the time of the day. Note that
these values together with the insurer’s policy are
required in order to compute the premium.
3. When the journey ends (e.g., when the user returns
to his home location) the premium calculation
operation is executed, returning as a result the
amount of money that the user has to pay.
4. After the premium is computed the log correspond-
ing to the journey (in our case, GPS coordinates and
timing information) needs to be encrypted and stored,
so that it can be later extracted by the policy holder.
We implement the CCM [79] mode for authentication
and confidentiality using AES [80] with a key length
of 128 bits. In order to avoid the possibility that a
malicious user tampers with the encrypted logs, we
also generate a signature of theGPS location datawith
the 2,048-bit private RSA key of the box, by using the
RSA-PSS [81] signature scheme.
5. Finally, we create the message to be sent to the
insurer with the fee as shown in (1). The RSA-PSS
signature scheme is used again together with the
RSA-OAEP [81] encryption scheme. These methods
make use of random padding encryption schemes to
achieve a higher level of security, hence a true
random number generator should be used (our
proof-of-concept implementation uses a software
pseudorandom number generator).
The performance of the main operations and routines
when running the previous test case are presented in Table 2.
The map-matching operation requires (in the worst case)
around 24 million cycles to find the closest entry, which
corresponds to 0.328 seconds when the microcontroller’s
clock is set to 72 MHz. This means that the microcontroller
can run at lower clock speeds (hence reducing the power
consumption) while still meeting the requirement that the
map-matching of one location point is done before the next
one arrives.
We note that our the map-matching operation is not
optimal, i.e., we have implemented a simple algorithm
based on the bisection method. The number of entries read
at each search could be decreased by using smarter
algorithms and more optimal digital maps, hence reducing
the computation time. Our main purpose is to show that,
even in our basic implementation, the microcontroller fully
supports the requirements of the PriPAYD system.
In the operations carried out at the end of the journey,
we see that the computation time of the premium
calculation is negligible compared to the encryption and
generation of the signature, which takes around 8 seconds.
We note that the encryption operation depends on the
length of the journey, e.g., an 80-minute journey would
require around four seconds.
Finally, the last rows in Table 2 refer to the premium
encryption operations. We must stress here that this
operation does not need to be done at the end of each
journey. We assume that there exists a contract between the
policy holder and the insurer which specifies how often the
total premium needs to be transmitted to the insurer, and the
intermediate premium results can be then just aggregated.
This operation can be assumed to be independent from the
length of the journeys, i.e., the fact that the amount to pay is
small or large does not affect the computational cost.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Legal Considerations
PAYD insurance based on the “Continuous Model”
transmits the full GPS data of the car’s location to the
insurance company for the calculation of the premium. As
we have already explained above, it is not necessary that
the server has knowledge over all these data for the
accomplishment of the intended purpose, namely offering
PAYD insurance. Such a “Continuous Model” was exam-
ined by the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL), which
made some interesting considerations on the compatibility
of such a system with the European data protection legal
framework. By using the CNIL opinion as a starting point,
in this section, we elaborate on the advantages of the
PriPAYD from a legal point of view and we also present
some potential limitations.
The CNIL dealt with the insurance policy that wished to
be introduced by the insurance company MAAF Assur-
ances S.A.1 MAAF Assurances S.A. planned to launch a
new insurance policy for young drivers, according to which
the latter would agree not to drive during the weekend at
night or longer than two hours, as well as not to exceed the
speed limit. To check compliance with the policy, the
insurance company would collect data related to the car’s
location, speed, type of road, hours and driving duration,
and transmit them every two minutes.
TRONCOSO ET AL.: PRIPAYD: PRIVACY-FRIENDLY PAY-AS-YOU-DRIVE INSURANCE 9
1. CNIL, De´libe´ration 2005-278 du 17 novembre 2005, portant refus de la
mise en oeuvre par la MAAF Assurances SA d’un traitement automatise` de
donne´es a` caracte`re personnel base´ sur la ge´olocalisation des ve´hicules.
(Opinion 2005-278 of 17 November 2005, refusing the data processing by
MAAF Assurances SA based on vehicles’ localisation).
TABLE 2
Timings of the Implementation
The CNIL refused its authorization for the processing of
the data. It argued that via the proposed system the
insurance company would get information about violations
of the speed limit. Such processing would involve sensitive
data and would infringe Article 9 of the French Data
Protection Act, according to which private entities are not
authorized to process data relating to criminal offences. The
CNIL further argued that the monitoring of data that reveal
the movements of the car and consequently its driver with
the exclusive aim the control of the respect of the contractual
obligations of the driver infringes the principle of propor-
tionality and the European principle of free movement of
persons.
Following the recommendations of CNIL, the solution
that has been later developed in order to launch PAYD in
France involves a trusted third party, who collects the user
data and sends the insurance company aggregate statistics
on the journeys made by the driver. The use of a third party
seemingly reduces the privacy issues discussed above, as
the insurance company collects now less information about
the users. However, this solution does not solve the problem
of excessive collection of personal information. The collec-
tion of the data from the third party may still constitute a
violation to the privacy of the driver, as sensitive informa-
tion can be derived from these data if additional measures
are not taken aiming at safeguarding privacy.
On the other hand, the approach taken in PriPAYD is
more privacy-friendly, as it does not allow the monitoring of
the car and its driver and it limits the processing of the data
to the absolutely necessary for the provision of the PAYD
insurance, in full respect of the principle of proportionality.
Further, in PriPAYD, the service provider processes only the
relevant and absolutely necessary data, in compliance with
the fundamental privacy principle of data minimization. In
order to bill the users, the insurance company does not need
to know the detailed route a car has followed, nor the exact
time of a journey. The PriPAYD model allows the insurance
company to learn the clients’ premium, while it avoids the
collection of any other tracking data. Although additional
information is stored on the black box, it remains under the
sole control of the user, at the client side. In this way, the
fundamental principles of proportionality and data mini-
mization are respected.
The necessary data for billing are transmitted to the
insurance company and to the other parties involved for the
provision of the PAYD service. This defines the purpose for
which the data are processed and any further processing
must be compatible with it. In the “Continuous Model,” the
abundance of collected data may tempt companies to
further process it, even in ways that cannot be considered
compatible, to gain some business advantage. Such proces-
sing of data that can be linked, with no excessive effort, to
the original user, is not allowed. Full anonymization of the
data would allow any processing, as the data would not
qualify as personal data any more, but such anonymization
is very difficult, if not impossible [12], [17].
The insurance company is allowed to keep the data for
the time period needed for the calculation of the insurance
premium and during which the bill can be disputed.2 After
this period of time, the insurance company has the
obligation to delete any collected data. A similar obligation
exists for the mobile operator that has to delete the data
after the provision of the service.3 However, the mobile
operator falls also under the scope of application of the data
retention directive,4 according to which the operator has to
retain specific categories of traffic and location data for a
period between six months and two years and have them
available for law enforcement purposes. It should be
pointed out that such an obligation does not exist for the
insurance company, as the directive creates an obligation
only for providers of publicly available electronic commu-
nications services or of public communications networks.
A crucial issue for the privacy offered by PriPAYD is the
ownership of the recording of the black box; one of the
principal goals of the model is that the company does not get
data that are not necessary for charging the users. The full
content of the black box with the detailed information that
can serve for the audit of the bill on behalf of the policy holder
must only be accessible to him. It is therefore important that
the contract between the insurance company and the policy
holder clarifies that, even if the actual black box belongs to
the company, the contained records belong exclusively to the
user. In case, this cannot be guaranteed, it is safer for the
ownership of the box to be transferred to the user from the
moment of its installation in the car.
As already mentioned above (see Section 3.2), the owner
of the car is also expected to make proper use of the black
box and to respect his obligations, mainly outlined in the
contract with the insurer. He is not allowed to delete the data
either from the black box or from the computer, where he
has kept a copy of it, before the time elapses, during which
the bill can be contested and the payment pursued. It cannot
be excluded that the car owner does not allow the proper
recording and transmission of the data that will affect his
final charging. He could, for instance, tamper with the black
box, block its programmed updates or shield the box in such
a way that it does not transmit. In all aforementioned cases,
his behaviour will be considered as a breach of his obligation
to make fair use of the box and will be held liable. The
insurance company will have the right to impose the
penalties foreseen in the contract and further seek legal
relief. In specific cases, the insurance company has also the
right to ask the car owner to adhere to one of the regular
insurance schemes or to ask the termination of the contract.
In the latter case, the insurance company shall give the car
owner the necessary time frame to conclude a new contract
with another insurance company.
A potential limitation of PAYD may appear in cases
when the policy holder and the driver of the car do not
coincide, as for rental cars or company vehicles. In such
cases, the driver should be informed about the presence of
the black box and its functionality. Especially, in the case of
rental cars, this should be explicitly mentioned in the car
rental contract. When company cars are used by employees
during their working hours, they should also be informed
about the installation of the system. It is still an open
question whether a company has the right to choose a
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2. Article 6 (e) data protection directive.
3. Article 9 ePrivacy directive.
4. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of
public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC,
Official Journal L105, pp. 54-63 (March 15, 2006).
PAYD insurance for a company owned car, which is used
by an employee outside working hours. Current practices
require the consent of both the employer and the employee.
5.2 Cost
PriPAYD does require more computations and mapping
data in the black box than the “Continuous Model.” Yet
these are comparable to what current commercial GPS
navigation systems do. Since the “Continuous Model”
already relies on tamper resistance for security no addi-
tional costs should be expected from this either. Given that
a processing unit with GSM and GPS interfaces is required
for any PAYD model, the only additional hardware
required in the PriPAYD black box is an external memory
module (i.e., SD card in our demonstrator), which should
not considerably increase the production costs.
Another source of costs is GSM communications and the
PriPAYD model should be cheaper since less data are
transmitted. Billing data can be aggregated to reduce those
costs further. Updates containing new rates, maps, and
policies, can be pushed to the black box either through the
GSM communications or during the servicing of the car. It
has to be taken into account that the extra amount of
updates associated to PriPAYD with respect to current
implementations, fees, and map updates (firmware updates
are needed in both schemes), is likely to be small. It is
reasonable to assume that the frequency with which fees are
recalculated is very low (for instance, Polis Direct did this
each year) and so is the rhythm with which new roads are
constructed and ready for usage.
The PriPAYD design keeps the trust infrastructure to a
minimum, and particularly does not require a public key
infrastructure. The identity infrastructure is based on the
preexisting relationship of the policy holder with the
insurance company that is used as part of the key distribu-
tion mechanism. Hence, there is no cost associated with
either of these.
In order to guarantee the integrity of the billing
information, we have presented a series of detection
mechanisms for fraud detection that could be used to trigger
legal recourses with customers. Although these processes
are expensive for the insurance company, they are not a
consequence of introducing privacy protection in the
system. Privacy-invasive PAYD implementations, as the
“Continuous Model,” suffer from the same vulnerabilities as
PriPAYD when it comes to the integrity of the inputs and
outputs of the black box. Thus, no additional cost in terms of
court costs is expected in PriPAYD with respect to other
implementations.
Finally, one has to take into account the cost of
development and maintenance of the infrastructure. The
technology and cryptography used is available off-the-shelf
and developing PriPAYD should not be more expensive
than the “Continuous Model.” The additional engineering
that is required for building a slightly more complex black
box should be more than balanced by the reduced costs of
the back-office systems, since they handle less, as well as
less sensitive data.
Yannacopoulos et al. [82] propose a model to estimate the
viability of the use of privacy enhancing technologies to
protect data. Their approach is to model how much do
clients value their privacy, and use this to compute the loss
a company would suffer if a breach of privacy occurs and its
clients need to receive compensation. This way, a company
can calculate the hypothetical savings achieved through the
use of privacy enhancing technologies.
5.3 Strengthening Privacy
Some additional privacy concerns should be tackled as part
of a real-world implementation.
One needs to ensure that past location information can
easily be deleted. We would advise implementers to never
automatically store encrypted GPS data from the audit
record; and users to keep this, or key material, only on the
USB stick to which they were written by the black box. This
allows the user to easily destroy the data by destroying or
deleting the USB stick. The downside of having a token that
can be destroyed as an easy and intuitive operation (a better
paradigm for destroying the private data than electronic
equivalents) is that, once audit records of the detailed
locations have been deleted, it is difficult to challenge any
bills that seem incorrect. In case, this is a user’s main worry
they can back up their records by simply copying the files to
a computer or other storage.
It could be sustained that in order to allow the user a
kind of guarantee for his privacy, he could be allowed to
delete the detailed record at the cost of not being able to
contest the correctness of past premiums (unless he had
previously recorded a copy of these records). However,
such an approach cannot be accepted unconditionally. The
retailed record shall be retained up to the end of the period
during which the bill may lawfully be challenged or
payment pursued. Any attempt on behalf of the user to
delete the data before the expiration of this period will
hinder the insurance company from checking the validity
and the content of the data. In case the user intentionally
deletes the data, he will be held liable for violating his
contractual obligations toward the insurance company.
Nevertheless, in case the deletion of the data is caused
due to a technical deficiency of the black box, then the
liability lies with the manufacturer.
A further concern is the use of GSM to transfer the data
back to the insurance company. In our scheme, the billing
data does not contain any sensitive location information,
but an active GSM device registered in the network does
leak the cells the car is visiting. Hence, it is prudent to keep
the GSM system powered down at all times except when
transmitting. The transmission time and location must be
chosen to minimize location leakage because of the GSM
technology. Defining and using a preferred known “home”
location, recorded in the box when initialized, should easily
address this concern. Still, a timer in the black box should
ensure that, even if the car is not present at this location for
a long period of time (e.g., long trip), the monthly premium
is sent to the company.
5.4 Certification and Independent Monitoring
The key objective of our design is to not require a trusted
black box to guarantee user’s privacy. This is an important
requirement: the black box is commissioned by the
insurance company and the user has only a limited capacity
to discern its functioning. Furthermore, independent
certification of even simple devices (such as the black box
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described) is expensive and appropriate certification criteria
have hardly been established.
Our design choice is to allow policy holders to have a full
view of the output of the black box and to ensure that only
the minimum billing information is transmitted. One option
is to allow a device (again a USB mass storage device would
be sufficient) to record all data sent between the black box
unit performing the calculations, and the GSM subsystem
that relays all the information back to the insurer. This
solution is not invulnerable to a maliciously programmed
black box that only reveals part of the conversation. On the
other hand, it makes certification easier, since only a trivial
property needs to hold: that all data transmitted using GSM
are also recorded on the auditing device. A second approach,
that offers stronger guarantees, is to physically separate (and
shield) the black box from the GSM transmitter, and link
them with a recording device controlled by the user. This
device would record all traffic, and allow the users to verify
that the data transmitted only contains the billing informa-
tion. Recording cables could be sold by multiple manufac-
turers, or provided by privacy advocacy groups or data
protection authorities.
The need to keep the security function of the black box
simple to facilitate verification, has guided our choice of a
one-button reinitialization mechanisms over more complex
access control to the data in the box. An alternative
mechanisms would be to require a PIN to be entered on
the black box to access the encryption keys or audit log. This
would make the operation and certification of the box more
complex, and the black box more expensive.
We note that trusting the black box is still necessary for
correct billing, and that the encrypted audit trail can be
used to check bills or dispute them. Without third-party
certification, it is impossible to ensure that the black box is
not recording precise location data with the intent to
provide them to a third party. Since such a box has no
way of transmitting the recorded data over the air, physical
access would be required to extract the data, making it
difficult to turn this weakness into a mass surveillance tool.
This is a known open problem [83], and physical access
would require additional certification.
The certification goals for the box to provide high grades
of assurance are:
. The random number generation should be based on a
physical source of randomness. A pseudorandom
number generatorwith a seed known to the insurance
company would produce predictable encryption
keys, leaving the audit logs unprotected. An alter-
native strategy would be for a device controlled by
the user to be able to set the initial state of the random
number generator.
. The deletion operation of the keys and the data upon
reinitialization of the box should be effective. Other-
wise the forward security property cannot any more
be guaranteed, since an adversary may be able to get
access to keys and logs from previous epochs. An
alternative could be for the box to not hold any
nonvolatile memory, aside a removable memory
chip—that theuser canphysically removeanddiscard
to preserve privacy.
. A thorough side channel analysis is necessary to
ensure that the black box does not leak or transmit
information through any other means than the
audited GSM transmission. Enclosing the black box
into a Faraday cage, using a conductive cover, could
ensure this. Yet the GPS antenna, as well as the GSM
module should be outside the enclosure.
. Finally, the correct implementation of the PriPAYD
procedures should be certified: the black box only
records the premium payment information; all raw
location information is stored only in an encrypted
form using the appropriate keys; and the reinitiali-
zation mechanisms works as advertised. This is only
required to protect against adversaries with local
access, since auditing ensure that no personal data
are transmitted remotely.
As always certifying a product to such a level is a
challenge, particularly since, for security reasons, the
insurance company should be able to update the software
to patch bugs. Two options are available to make this
possible. The first is that the full update can be signed by a
certification authority, after evaluation of the new features.
Such reevaluation is expensive, and might slow down the
deployment of security critical updates. The second option is
for the software to be built in such away that it cannot violate
the key security properties as described in the previous
paragraph: it does not have the interfaces to store unen-
crypted data or signal to the outside world in any other
channel but the audited one. In this way, the original
software and updates are sandboxed, and cannot violate
the key properties required by PriPAYD, requiring only the
infrequent certification of the sandbox.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Pay-As-You-Drive insurance policies, due to their advan-
tages, are bound to gain popularity or even dominate the
car insurance market. However, their most advanced
current implementations show a fundamental disregard
for the privacy of car owners, which might even slow or
limit their deployment. Our survey of existing systems and
practices sadly documents a move toward more, not less,
privacy-invasive systems.
PriPAYD is a system that can support the deployment of
very fine granularity PAYD policies while also providing
strong privacy guarantees. Its core security architecture is
based on simple and well-understood multilevel security
components, that have been the subject of extensive study
in the field of computer security since the 1970s. The
PriPAYD architecture relies (as previous systems) on secure
hardware for correct accounting, but privacy properties can
be checked without relying on its correctness, just by
auditing its output. This separates correct accounting from
privacy concerns, allowing black boxes to remain fully
under the control of insurance companies, while users can
be sure that none of their location data are leaking. Our
approach follows the paradigm of many security metering
systems used for electricity or gas distribution that only
record aggregate use.
There is no component or infrastructure required by
PriPAYD that would make it much more expensive than
current systems, as we demonstrate with our implementa-
tion. One could in fact argue that in the long run running
12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 8, NO. X, XXXXXXX 2011
PriPAYD as any other privacy enhanced technology, is
cheaper than privacy-invasive systems. The cost of protect-
ing private data stores is often overlooked in the accounting
of costs, as is the risk of a single security breach leaking the
location data of millions of policy holders [14], [15]. In
addition, PriPAYD keeps sensitive data locally in each car,
in a simple to engineer and verify system. Requiring off-the-
shelf back-end system to provide the same level of privacy
protection to masses of data would make them, not only
prohibitively expensive, but simply unimplementable.
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